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Anderson: A.E. Staley v. Commissioner
A.E. STALEY MANUFACTURING CO. V. COMMISSIONER: LIFE AFTER INDOPCO:
TAX TREATMENT OF A TARGET CORPORATION'S UNSUCCESSFUL HOSTILE
TENDER OFFER DEFENSE FEES
"Here,indeed, as so often in otherbranchesof the law, the decisive distinctionsare
those of degree and not of kind. One strugglesfor any verbal formula that will
supply a ready touchstone. The standardset up by the statute is not a rule of law;
it is rathera way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the
riddle.,,

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years, companies have increasingly focused on corporate reengineering and industry consolidation to strengthen their competitive positions.
One result of this focus has been an increase in corporate merger and acquisition
activity.2
When a target corporation first confronts a takeover attempt, the corporation will
typically retain the services of an investment banker. Investment banking fees and
other takeover-related professional costs can amount to millions of dollars.4 As a
result, one important issue for target corporations incurring takeover-related
professional fees concerns the proper tax treatment of those fees.5
In 1992, the Supreme Court first considered the tax treatment of investment
banking and other professional fees incurred by a target corporation during a
friendly takeover in INDOPCO,Inc. v. Commissioner.6 The Court held that the fees

Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1933) (Justice Cardozo writing about the
difficulty of distinguishing between ordinary business expenses and capital expenditures for
income tax purposes).
2 Mark B. Persellin, Takeover Defense Expenditures: Deductibility Not Necessarily
Precluded by National Starch, TAX EXEC., May 1, 1990, at 2, available in 1990 WL
2590112.
' Id. at 1-2. ("Regardless of whether a takeover attempt is 'friendly' or 'hostile,' the
directors will be compelled to take several takeover-related actions.").
' Kevin J. Coenen, Capital or Ordinary Expense? The Proper Tax Treatment of a
TargetCorporation'sExpendituresin an Acquisitive Reorganization,58 OHIO ST. L.J. 583,
616 (1997).
' Persellin, supra note 2, at 2.
6 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
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were properly capitalized due to the significant benefits received by the target
corporation which extended beyond the current tax year.7 After the INDOPCO
decision, taxpayers and tax practitioners alike speculated as to the scope of its
holding.'
One specific concern was whether the INDOPCO decision represented a per se
rule that takeover-related expenses must always be capitalized. 9 The recent Seventh
Circuit decision of A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner1° appears to

have answered this question in the negative." In Staley, the Court of Appeals held
that the majority of investment banker fees paid in an unsuccessful attempt to defeat
a hostile tender offer were deductible as "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses. 12 Alternatively, those expenses allocable to the company's unsuccessful
efforts to engage in alternate transactions were deductible as "abandoned transac-

Id. at 88.
John Paul LeBlanc, The Supreme Court Attempts to "Iron Out" the Wrinkles in

NationalStarch, 54 LA. L. REv. 437,437 (1993) ("INDOPCOhas resulted in confusion for
taxpayers and tax attorneys, who are unsure what test applies to determine the deductibility
of expenditures."); see also Sarah R. Lyke, Note, INDOPCO, Inc. v. CommissionerNationalStarch DecisionAdds Wrinkles to CapitalExpenditure Issue, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.

1239, 1270 (1994) (writing that "the decision's broad language leaves open the question of
whether capitalization is always required whenever an expenditure produces a significant
long-term benefit"); Richard M. Lipton ET AL., Supreme Court Approves Focus on LongTerm Benefit in Takeover Controversy, 76 J. TAX'N 324, 329 (1992) ("[I]t is unclear what

the impact of INDOPCOwill be outside of the takeover arena. It is possible that the IRS
will use the case to justify capitalization of any expenditure that results in a long-term
benefit to the taxpayer, even if such expenditure provides short-term benefits as well.").
9

Richard M. Lipton, Divided Tax CourtApplies INDOPCO to Hostile Takeovers, 84

J. TAX'N 21, 21 (1996).
10

119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997).

" Staley is not the first court to consider fees incurred by a target corporation in a hostile
context. In Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner,99 T.C. 648, 661 (1992), the taxpayer

attempted to distinguish INDOPCOby arguing that the takeover of the company's stock was
hostile. The Tax Court, however, never addressed the hostile issue because it found
sufficient evidence of long-term benefits under INDOPCO to require capitalization. Id. at
662-65. Cf United States v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. (In re Federated Dep't Stores), 171
B.R. 603, 610-13 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding that break-up fees paid to failed white
knight merger transactions in response to a hostile tender offer were properly deductible as
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses due to no anticipated future benefits; the
expenses were also deductible as "abandoned transactions"); see also infranote 40 (defining
white knight).
12 Staley, 119 F.3d at 491.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/3
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tions. ' ' 3 However, fees paid by Staley to evaluate its stock required capitalization
because they facilitated the completed merger. 4
The Staley decision is unlikely to be the final word on the tax treatment of a
target corporation's hostile defense fees. This Note will explore the impact of the
Staley decision from both a historical and prospective viewpoint. First, this Note
will set out the statutory background and major tests developed by the courts over
time to determine the appropriate tax treatment of expenses. 5 In the discussion of
the major tests, this Note will review the test employed in INDOPCO and the
Supreme Court's reasoning in that decision.' 6 It will then address the Staley opinion
and its underlying rationale. 17 This Note will explore the tests employed by the
Staley court," critically analyze the court's approach and its reasoning, 9 and assess
some of the practical ramifications of the decision.2 ° Finally, it will suggest a
simpler and perhaps more satisfactory approach than that utilized by the Staley
court.2 '

II.BACKGROUND

A. OrdinaryBusiness Expenses vs. CapitalExpenditures
One of the most difficult areas in tax law involves distinguishing between
expenses which can be deducted from taxable income when incurred and those
which must be capitalized over a period of years.22 This distinction is one of great

13

id.

14

Id.

See infra PART II.
See infra PART II(C).
17 See infra PART III.
18 See infra PART IV(A).
19 See infra PART IV(B).
20 See infra PART IV(C).
21 See infra PART IV(D).
'"

16

' Peter L. Faber, INDOPCO:The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAW. 607, 607 (1994).
Not all expenditures made by a taxpayer in a given tax period give rise to a deduction in that
same tax period. Melissa D. Ingalls, INDOPCO,Inc. v. Commissioner:Determining the
Taxable Nature of a Target Corporation'sTakeover Expenses, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 1165,
1169 (1994). In general, an expenditure which produces a benefit greater than one year must
be capitalized. Id. Likewise, an expenditure to acquire an asset with a useful life lasting
longer than one year must also be capitalized. Id. A capital expenditure is an expenditure
for the "acquisition of property or a permanent improvement in the property's value." Id.
If the expenditure is for a tangible asset, such as furniture, fixtures, and equipment,
capitalization is accomplished by depreciating the cost of the asset over its determinable
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importance, since the time value of money renders current deductions significantly
more valuable to the taxpayer than future deductions.23
Historically, the applicable Internal Revenue Code provisions alone have not
provided a satisfactory framework for determining the appropriate tax treatment of
expenses. As a result, judicial interpretation has played an important role in two
primary areas: (1) interpretation of Internal Revenue Code provisions,24 and (2)
development of various tests by the Supreme Court and circuit courts to assist them
further in determining the proper tax treatment of expenses. 25 Unfortunately, even
judicial interpretation has not produced a clear, consistent road map for courts to
follow.

26

useful life. Id. Similarly, if the expenditure is for an intangible asset, capitalization is
accomplished by amortizing the cost of the asset over its useful life. Id. The useful life must
be ascertainable with reasonable accuracy. Id. Certain intangible assets, such as goodwill,
have useful lives which cannot be determined with reasonable accuracy. Id. at 1170. If the
useful life cannot be determined with reasonable accuracy, no depreciation or amortization
is allowed over the life of the asset. Id. Therefore, there is little or no tax value to the
taxpayer; the taxpayer cannot recover the cost of the asset until dissolution of the
corporation. Id.
23 Lyke, supra note 8, at 1239-40. The distinction is particularly important in the context
of a target corporation's professional fees. Ingalls, supranote 22, at 1170-71. If takeoverrelated fees are determined to be capital expenditures, an intangible asset is created. Id. at
1170. In all likelihood, the fees will not have a reasonably determinable useful life. Id.
Consequently, no tax deduction for amortization or depreciation will be allowed; the only
available tax deduction for the corporation would be upon dissolution of the enterprise. Id.
at 1170-71. Such a tax deduction is of minimal value to the taxpayer because it does not
allow the taxpayer to recover the cost of the fees over time. Id. This is particularly true
when compared to the attractive tax benefit received if the expenses are deductible against
income in the current tax period. Id. at 1171.
2 Applicable Internal Revenue Code provisions in this Note include Sections 162(a) and
165(a). See infra notes 29 & 37 and accompanying text.
2' Ingalls, supranote 22, at 1171, 1173.
26 Id. at 1173. Although the application of various judicially-developed tests has
resulted in no clear consensus as to the appropriate test to apply with takeover-related
expenses, courts appear to agree that income tax deductions are a "matter of legislative
grace," and the taxpayer bears the burden of "clearly showing the right to the claimed
deduction." Id. Each determination is largely fact-specific. Id.; see also Interstate Transit
Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943); Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493
(1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
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B. Statutory Provisions
In theory, the Internal Revenue Code attempts to match the revenues received in
a taxable period with the expenses incurred to generate those revenues.2 7 The
desired result is a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes.28
1. Ordinary Business Expenses
There are five requirements to qualify for an allowable deduction under Section
162(a) 29 of the Internal Revenue Code: "[A]n item must (1) be 'paid or incurred
during the taxable year,' (2) be for 'carrying on any trade or business,' (3) be an
'expense,' (4) be a 'necessary expense,' and (5) be an 'ordinary' expense. 3 °
Interpretations of "ordinary" and "necessary" have historically been common
sources of controversy. 31 To be classified as an "ordinary" expense, an expense
need not occur on a regular basis; an "ordinary" expense may occur only once in a
27

INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79,84 (1992). By distinguishing between

expenditures which are ordinary business expenses and those which are capital expenditures,
Congress has attempted to develop a consistent and accurate method of matching the timing
of expenditures with the revenues from which the expenditures arise. Bryan Mattingly,
Note, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: Will the IRS Use a Nebulous Supreme Court
Decision to Capitalizeon Unsuspecting Taxpayers?, 81 KY. L.J. 801, 805-06 (1993). The
underlying rationale for distinguishing between the two categories of expenditures is to
reduce the taxpayer's ability to manipulate taxable income. Id. at 805. For example, if both
types of expenditures were currently deductible, a taxpayer could dramatically reduce a
particular period's taxable income by purchasing a costly asset in that period. Id. at 806.
28 INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
29 I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 1997) provides:
In general.--There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including-(1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered;
(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging other
than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away
from home in the pursuit of a trade or business; and
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the continued use
or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the
taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
30
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971)
(establishing the five part test for current deductibility).
31 Jeffrey Gates Davis, Comment, INDOPCO, Inc v. Commissioner: NationalStarch
Isn't the Only One "Stiffed" by the Supreme Court'sDecision,20 PEPP. L. REv. 1455, 1462
(1993).
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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taxpayer's lifetime provided the expense is customary within the taxpayer's
business community.32 "Necessary" connotes only a minimum threshold that the
expense was at least "appropriate and helpful" for the development of the
taxpayer's business.33
2. Capital Expenditures
Section 263(a)( 1)34 of the Internal Revenue Code allows no current deductions
for "any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or
betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate. 35 Capital
expenditures must be amortized or depreciated over the life of the relevant asset.36
3. Abandoned Transactions
An alternative to deductibility under Section 162(a) in certain circumstances is
Section 165(a). 37 This Code provision permits a current deduction for "any loss
38
sustained during the taxable year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise.
Generally, expenses incurred in the development of plans involving the organization
or reorganization of corporations become deductible when the plans are
abandoned.39 In the hostile takeover context, a 1994 United States District Court
decision held that break-up fees incurred as a result of failed white knight 4° mergers
in response to a hostile tender offer were properly deductible as "abandoned
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933) ('The situation is unique in the life of
the individual affected, but not in the life of the group, the community, of which he is a
part.").
33 Id. at 113; see also Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 471 (1943). Because
"appropriate" and "helpful" are broad and subjective terms, virtually any expense in a
taxpayer's business will meet the "necessary" prong of the five-part test. Ingalls, supra note
22, at 1172.
34 I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (West 1997).
32

35 Id.

INDOPCO, Inc. v. Cornmissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992); see also Ingalls, supra
note 22.
31 I.R.C. § 165(a) (West 1997).
38 Id.
3' El Paso Co. v. United States, 694 F.2d 703, 712 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (holding here,
however, that expenses incurred to create an entity to serve as a vehicle for divestiture were
not deductible as abandoned plans because the entity was eventually used for the very
purpose for which it was created).
40 A white knight is "a potential acquirer usually sought out by the target of an
unfriendly takeover to rescue it from the unwanted bidder's takeover." BLACK'S LAW
36

DICTIONARY 1596 (6th ed. 1990).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/3
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transactions" as well as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses."
C. Tests for Deductibility
While the various judicially-created tests to determine tax deductibility have not
provided a bright-line standard, most of the tests share one thread of consistency:
the focus of the inquiry is on the presence and duration of an expenditure's
benefits.4 2 The tests pertinent to the Staley decision are set out below. 3
1. Business Attack Defense
Expenses incurred by a taxpayer while defending its business and corporate

4"United States v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. (In re Federated Dep't Stores), 171 B.R.
603, 611-13 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (rejecting the IRS's argument that there was only one
transaction (a successful merger) and finding instead two mutually exclusive capital
transactions (a successful merger with the hostile acquirer and a failed merger with the white
knights) such that the breakup fees related to the failed merger with the white knights and
were, therefore, deductible)).
42 Ingalls, supra note 22, at 1174 (stating that a corporate expenditure is a capital
expenditure if it betters the corporation for (1) the duration of its existence, (2) the indefinite
future, or (3) longer than the current tax year).
"3Two other important judicially-created tests are the "primary purpose" test and the
"origin of the claim" test. The "primary purpose" test looks to the taxpayer's purpose or
motive in incurring an expense to determine if the taxpayer anticipated a long-term benefit
which must be capitalized; this test was first articulated in the 1946 case of Rassenfoss v.
Commissioner, 158 F.2d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 1946). The subjective nature of the "primary
purpose" test has been criticized often; in 1963, the United States Supreme Court adopted
a standard for tax deductibility based upon the "origin of the claim." United States v.
Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963). Rather than focus on the taxpayer's motive for incurring
an expense, this test purportedly established an objective standard by focusing on the nature
of the claim which gave rise to the expense; that is, the "origin and character of the claim
with respect to which an expense was incurred .. " Id. In Gilmore, the court held that
legal fees incurred by a taxpayer in a divorce action to defend his business assets from his
wife's community property claims had their "origins" in the marital relationship and not in
the taxpayer's business; therefore, the expenses were personal expenses and not deductible.
Id. at 51-52. For an in-depth treatment of some of the shortfalls of the "origin of the claim"
test, see Timothy A. Rodgers, Note, The TransactionApproach to the Origin of the Claim
Doctrine: A Proposed Curefor Chronic Inconsistency, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 905, 905-09
(1989) (stating that one of the reasons for chronic inconsistency of the test is that the
"origin" and "character" language requires a court to apply the test to two entirely different
elements).
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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policies from attack are deductible as "ordinary and necessary" expenses.' This
principle has been applied by different courts within the federal judiciary; the most
common applications have been in the context of litigation expenses and proxy fight
expenses. 45 The business attack defense has been recognized for over fifty years,
and has not been abrogated by any subsequently developed judicial tests.46
2. "Separate and Distinct Asset" Test
In 1971, the Supreme Court enunciated a test in Commissioner v. Lincoln
Savings and Loan Ass 'n.47 that signaled a departure from the traditional benefits
inquiry. In Lincoln, financial institutions were required to make premium payments
to a Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Secondary Reserve.48 The
Court held that the payments to the Secondary Reserve created a "separate and
distinct asset"; therefore, the payments were capital in nature and not deductible as
an ordinary business expense. 49 The Court also noted that possibility of a future
benefit does not mandate treatment as a capital expenditure, because many
currently deductible expenses have "prospective effect" beyond the taxable year. 5°
The decision resulted in great confusion. Based on Lincoln, several courts
concluded that presence of future benefits was no longer relevant, and that the sole

44A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482,487 (7th Cir. 1997);
see also Persellin, supra note 2, at 27 (stating that costs directly related to defending
corporate policies "do not give rise to any long-term benefit or other capital asset and
therefore should be deductible").
41 Staley, 119 F.3d at 488; see, e.g., Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 469-75
(1943) (holding that legal expenses incurred by a dentist with a mail order business to enjoin
enforcement of a mail fraud order were deductible considering that the enforcement of the
order posed a threat to the dentist's continued existence of his lawful business); Locke
Manufacturing Cos. v. United States, 237 F.Supp. 80, 82-84 (D. Conn. 1964) (holding that
proxy contest expenses incurred by a corporate taxpayer to successfully resist a stockholder's challenge of corporate policy were deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses).
46 Staley, 119 F.3d at 487-88 ("We begin our pragmatic assessment with the well-worn
notion that expenses incurred in defending a business and its policies from attack are
necessary and ordinary--and deductible--business expenses."). The Staley court further said,
"The foregoing line of authority was neither abrogated nor indeed even addressed by
INDOPCO...." Id. at488.
-7 403 U.S. 345 (1971).

48 Id. at 348. Each institution had a pro rata share of the Secondary Reserve which was
available in the event of a loss by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Id.
at 350.

49

Id.

so Id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/3
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inquiry should be whether the expense created a "separate and distinct asset."'"
3. Long-term Benefits
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in INDOPCO to settle a "perceived
conflict" among the Courts of Appeals as to whether the Lincoln test was the
exclusive test for determining an expenditure's tax deductibility. The INDOPCO
decision unequivocally renewed focus on future or long-term benefits as a means
of distinguishing an ordinary business expense from a capital expenditure.5 3
In INDOPCO,Unilever United States, Inc. ("Unilever") expressed an interest in
acquiring INDOPCO's predecessor, National Starch and Chemical Corporation
("National Starch") through a friendly acquisition. 54 National Starch engaged
investment banker Morgan Stanley to evaluate its shares, render a fairness opinion,
and otherwise generally assist the company.55 The Supreme Court held that
investment banking and other professional fees incurred in the friendly takeover
were capital expenditures based on the significant long-term benefits to National
Starch.56 The Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that since the expense did not
create a "separate and distinct asset", no capitalization was required.57 The Court
clarified Lincoln by stating that while creation of a "separate and distinct asset" may
be a sufficient condition for classification as a capital expenditure, it is not a
necessary condition.58 Instead, the Court focused on future benefits. 5 While the
5' Faber, supra note 22, at 610-11 (noting that in BriarcliffCandy Corp. v. Commis-

sioner, 475 F.2d 775, 782 (2nd Cir. 1973), the court relied on Lincoln in holding that
expenses incurred in expanding a company's business were deductible because no separate
asset was created; likewise, the court in NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 291
(4th Cir. 1982) held that bank expenses to establish a branch banking system were deductible
because they, too, did not create a separate asset)).
52

Jeffrey A. Friedman, Note, INDOPCO,Inc. v. Commissioner: The Deductibilityof

a Target'sAcquisition Costs, 48 Bus. LAw. 1243, 1249 (1993) (citing INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 83 (1992)).
53INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 88.
54 Id. at 80.
55Id. at 81.
56

Id. at 88.

57Id. at 86-87.

Id. at 87.
" Id. at 88. The Court found evidence of three long-term benefits to National Starch.
Id. First, National Starch's "Progress Report" remarked favorably on the benefits to
National Starch from Unilever's abundant resources. Id. Second, Morgan Stanley's fairness
opinion noted the "synergy" the resulting merger would produce. Id. Finally, National
Starch benefited by changing from a publicly held corporation to a wholly owned subsidiary
58
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"mere presence of an incidental future benefit... may not warrant capitalization,
a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure is
the appropriate tax
incurred is undeniably important in determining whether
6°
capitalization.
or
treatment is immediate deduction
H. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
61
The primary business of A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. ("AES") was the
62
production of high fructose corn syrup for the food and beverage industry.
Because AES believed this product had a mature market, the company made a long63
term strategic decision in 1984 to diversify into the food service business.
Consistent with this strategy, AES acquired other companies.'

An investment banker threatened to acquire Staley Continental Inc. and
65
Subsidiaries ("SCI") in 1986, and SCI began to fear a hostile takeover. SCI hired
two investment bankers, First Boston Corporation ("First Boston") and Merrill
Lynch Capital Markets ("Merrill Lynch"),66to advise and assist the company in the
event of another hostile takeover attempt.
Shortly thereafter, Merrill Lynch recommended various anti-takeover defense
strategies to SCI. 67 One of Merrill Lynch's suggestions was for SCI to identify

through reduction of shareholder relations expenses. Id.
o Id. at 87. The Court concluded it analysis by stating that the acquisition-related
expenses "bear the indicia of capital expenditures." Id. at 90. However, the Court did not
define "indicia", nor did it define "future benefits" or "incidental future benefits." Lipton
ET AL., supra note 8, at 326. Further, the decision leaves open the question of what other
factors, in addition to taxpayer benefits extending beyond the tax year, may be relevant in
identifying a capital expenditure. Id. As a result, the INDOPCOdecision did not provide
a bright-line standard. Id.
61 A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company and Subsidiaries ("Staley") was an affiliated
group of corporations formerly named Staley Continental Inc. and Subsidiaries ("SCI").
A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 483 (7th Cir. 1997). AES
was the predecessor of both Staley and SCI. Id.
62 Id. at 483-84.
63 Id. at 484.
' Id. One of the companies AES acquired was CFS Continental ("CFS"), a leading
food service supplier. Id. SCI was formed as the parent company to AES and CFS. Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. SCI also agreed to hire the investment bankers if an offer were made. Id.
67 Id.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/3
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friendly white knight 61 investors who could acquire enough SCI stock to block
future takeover attempts.69
In response to this suggestion, SCI identified Tate & Lyle PLC ("T & L") as a
possible white knight.70 The top executives at both companies discussed the
possibility of T & L acquiring up to a 20 percent interest in SCI. 7 In April 1987,
T & L began buying SCI stock on the open market; after acquiring 4 percent of
SCI's stock, T & L refused to sign a "standstill agreement. 7 2 Instead, T & L filed
a Hart-Scott-Rodino notification73 to acquire up to 25.% of SCI's stock.7 4
On April 8, 1988, T & L made a public tender offer directly to SCI shareholders
to purchase their stock for $32 per share.75 SCI and the investment bankers
considered T & L's tender offer to be hostile because it was made without their
consent or knowledge.76 Cognizant of their fiduciary duty to evaluate the merits of
the tender offer, SCI's board of directors hired First Boston and Merrill Lynch to
advise and assist them in evaluating T & L's offer.77 SCI agreed to an investment
banking fee structure which provided for $1 million in fixed compensation with

68
69

See supra note 40 (defining white knight).
Staley, 119 F.3d at 484.

Id. Tate & Lyle PLC was a publicly held United Kingdom corporation which was the
largest sugar refiner and distributor in the world. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v.
Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 169 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1997).
71 Staley, 119 F.3d at 484.
72 Id. The standstill agreement would have limited the amount of stock T & L could
purchase. Id.
73A Hart-Scott-Rodino notification is a premerger notification. The notification is part
of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act, a procedural statute that strengthens
the Department of Justice's antitrust enforcement powers. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 718
(6th ed. 1990).
74 Staley, 119 F.3d at 484.
71 Id. On the same day, T & L also sued SCI to enjoin the use of their anti-takeover
devices and the application of various states' anti-takeover statutes. Id. These challenges
were ultimately unsuccessful. Staley, 105 T.C. at 177. In addition, T & L's Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer sent a letter to his SCI counterpart stating that if his bid were
successful, he intended to disband SCI's diversification strategy and return the company to
its core business of corn syrup. Staley, 119 F.3d at 484.
76 Staley, 119 F.3d at 484. The SCI defense team also concluded that the tender offer
was not in SCI's best interests due to T & L's lack of capital, marketing, and research and
development. Id.
70

77 Id.
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additional compensation contingent on an acquisition or recapitalization of SCI.78
SCI and the investment bankers began considering various alternatives to the
tender offer including recapitalization, a leveraged buy-out, 79 and a sale to a white
knight.8" The investment bankers' evaluation of SCI stock revealed that $32 per
share was below the company's true value.8 1
82
On April 20, SCI's board voted unanimously to reject T & L's tender offer.
Without any further solicitation from SCI, T & L raised its offering price to $35 per
share on April 29, and the board again rejected the tender offer.83 On May 13, T &
L increased its offering price to $36.50 per share. 84 The investment bankers advised
SCI that the offer was fair and that they had been unsuccessful in finding any other
suitable alternatives.85 SCI's board recommended that shareholders accept the

offer, and T & L subsequently acquired SCI. 86 SCI paid $6,238,109 to First Boston

and $6,272,593 to Merrill Lynch for services related to SCI's response to T & L's
tender offers.87
B. ProceduralHistory

SCI deducted the investment banking fees on its federal income tax return as

Id. The investment banking fee arrangements provided the following: (1) $500,000
in cash; (2) an additional fee of 0.40% of the value of the transaction if T & L or another
company acquired at least 50 percent of SCI's stock; (3) an additional fee of 0.40% of the
recapitalization if SCI effected a recapitalization; and (4) additional quarterly fees of
$500,000 for four quarters if no fees were paid under (2) or (3). Id.
79 A leveraged buy-out is a method of purchasing the outstanding stock of a publicly
held corporation by management or outside investors with financing obtained primarily from
borrowed funds from investment bankers or brokers; the capital is usually secured by the
target company's assets with repayment generated from the company's current and future
operations. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 906 (6th ed. 1990).
78

80 Staley, 119 F.3d at 484.
81 Id. at 485.
82 Id.

83

A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 176 (1995), rev'd,

119 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1997).
84 Staley, 119 F.3d at485.
85
86

Id.

Id. After the sale, T & L replaced SCI's management, terminated 104 executives,

fired the clerical staff, moved the executive offices, and sold CFS. Staley, 105 T.C. at 179.
87 Staley, 119 F.3d at 485.
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ordinary business expenses.88 The Commissioner disallowed the claimed deduction
and issued a notice of deficiency.89 SCI challenged the disallowance by filing a
petition in the United States Tax Court.9"
1. United States Tax Court Proceedings
The full Tax Court, with five judges dissenting, held that the investment banking
fees9 1 were not deductible under Section 162(a) as ordinary business expenses or
under Section 165(a) as "abandoned transactions. 92 The court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that the hostile nature of the acquisition distinguished Staley
from INDOPCO.93 Instead, the Tax Court began with the proposition that since the
purpose of the relevant Tax Code provisions is to match expense with income, the
"taxpayer's subjective reasons for making the expenditure are irrelevant."94 The
court relied on 1NDOPCO and the "origin of the claim" test, finding that the
transaction which gave rise to the claim was a change in corporate structure and
ownership.95 The change had long-term consequences to SCI, 96 and therefore, the
expenses required capitalization. 97
The majority rejected deductibility as an "abandoned transaction" because it held
that the taxpayer must be able to allocate the abandonment fees to separate and

88

Id. at 483. $165,318 of printing costs were also deducted, $50,000 of which was

disallowed. It was not clear from the record why a portion of the fees was allowed. Id. at
485.
89 Id.

9 Id.
91 The Tax Court also disallowed the printing costs of $50,000. Staley, 105 T.C. at 200.
92 Id. at 201-02.
91 Id. at 194.
94 Staley, 119 F.3d at 485. The Tax Court rejected the "primary purpose" test. Staley,
105 T.C. at 195. For a discussion of the "primary purpose" test, see supra note 43.
9' Staley, 105 T.C. at 195. The Tax Court interpreted INDOPCO as requiring
capitalization whenever there was a change in corporate ownership which had long-term
consequences. Id. at 200. The INDOPCO Court, however, did not use the "origin of the
claim" test in reaching its decision. Ingalls, supra note 22, at 1200. For a discussion of the
"origin of the claim" test, see supra note 43.
96 Like INDOPCO, the Tax Court also found shareholder-related benefits to SCI by
changing from a publicly held corporation to a wholly owned subsidiary. Staley, 105 T.C.
at 197-98.
97 Id. Judge Beghe wrote a concurring opinion to advance another theory for fee
nondeductibility. Id. at 202-03 (Beghe, J., concurring). In his view, the investment bankers'
fee provided a benefit to SCI shareholders by helping them obtain a higher price for their
shares than T & L's initial offer. Id.
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distinct proposals.98 In this case, the bulk of the investment banking fees were
contingent on a completed stock sale and not an abandoned transaction.99
Trial Judge Cohen dissented and distinguished this case from INDOPCO.1°° In
contrast to INDOPCO, there was no evidence in Staley that SCI anticipated any
benefits from a merger with T & L.' 1 1 Therefore, "the purpose of the expenditures
was not' 1to2 facilitate a change in corporate structure, but to prevent such a

change."

0

In a second dissent joined by two other judges, Judge Laro stressed a long-term
benefits inquiry.'0 3 He, too, found no long-term benefits to SCI.1c 4 He concluded
that the appropriate "legal analysis would address the issue as to whether or not the
whether there were any
takeover was hostile or friendly for the purpose of seeing
10 5
long-term benefits in connection with the transaction."'
2. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit Proceedings
The Court of Appeals held that all investment banking fees in Staley were
10 6
deductible with the exception of fees that facilitated the T & L acquisition.
Accordingly, the court reversed the Tax Court decision and remanded the case back
to the Tax Court for proper fee allocation. 0 7
The court's discussion began with the "well worn" notion that expenses incurred
in defending a business and its policies from attack are "ordinary and necessary"

98 Id. at 200.
99 Id.
'0' Id. at 210 (Cohen, J., dissenting). Four other judges joined Judge Cohen's dissent.
Id. at 217.
'1 Id. at 215 ("The only benefits to the future operations of petitioner discussed in the
majority opinion are those perceived by the offeror, Tate & Lyle, and not by the management
that incurred the expenses.").
'0 Staley, 119 F.3d at 486. Judge Cohen read the majority's rule as a stringent one
requiring capitalization of any expenses related to a change in corporate ownership. Staley,
105 T.C. at 217 (Cohen, J., dissenting).
'0' Staley, 105 T.C. at 218-20 (Laro, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 219.
105 Id. Judge Laro also wrote that while the majority considered the purpose of the
expenditures irrelevant, INDOPCO,by contrast, emphasized the purpose. Id. at 220.
106 Staley, 119 F.3d at 492.
1"'Id. at 492-93.
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business expenses.'
The Court of Appeals interpreted INDOPCO as "merely
reaffirming settled law that costs incurred to facilitate a capital transaction are
capital costs."'0 9
The court determined that the totality of the Tax Court's factual findings made
it clear that SCI incurred the majority of the investment banking fees while
defending their business from an unwanted acquisition." 0 Therefore, these
expenses were deductible under Section 162(a) as "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses."'
The court then looked at the nature of the services performed by the investment
bankers. 1 12 The court found that the main efforts of the investment bankers were
directed towards defeating a hostile tender offer by exploring alternative capital
transactions. 13 None of these efforts facilitated the T & L acquisition." 4 Because
the efforts failed, SCI did not obtain long-term benefits like the INDOPCO
taxpayer. 1 5 The court held, therefore, that the costs properly allocable to the
unsuccessful efforts of the investment bankers to engage in alternate transactions
' ' 16
were also deductible under Section 165(a) as "abandoned transactions."
The court concluded its analysis by determining that a few facilitative tasks
performed by the investment bankers required capitalization." 7 In particular, the
court found that the fees attributable to the evaluation of SCI stock required
capitalization, because the evaluation was eventually used to determine that T & L's

108 Id. at

487. The court noted that the INDOPCOdecision did not abrogate, or even

address, this longstanding rule. Id. at 488.
"9Id. The court then framed the Staley issue in the following terms: Are the investment
banking costs more properly viewed as costs associated with defending a business or as costs
associated with facilitating a capital transaction? Id. at 489.
"0 Id. at 490. The factual findings included SCI's consideration of the offer as hostile
because it was made without their consent or knowledge, the board's initial reaction that the
T & L offer was inadequate and T & L lacked marketing, capital, and research and
development, T & L's attack on SCI's diversification policy, and T & L's post merger
actions of selling CFS, replacing management, fiing executives and clerical staff, and
closing the company's headquarters. Id. at 489-90.
"' Id. at 491.
112 Id. at 490.
113 id.
114 Id.
"' Id. at 492.
116 Id. at 491.
"' Id. at 490.
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final offer was fair." 8
In making its fee allocation, the investment banking fee arrangement was viewed
as one relevant consideration. 19 In the court's view, however, the primary purpose
of the fee arrangement was for the investment bankers to get paid regardless of the
outcome. 120 In that event, "the substance of the transaction, not its form, is
controlling. 12'
IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Staley Two-Test Approach

The court's approach to the issues presented in Staley was primarily a detailed,
mechanical approach. This approach was dictated, in part, by the court's use of two
different tests for tax deductibility. On one hand, the court used the business attack
defense. 22 At the same time, the court also purported to use INDOPCO'slong-term
benefits test which effectively analyzes an expense to determine if it facilitated a
capital transaction "for the benefit of future operations." 123 The court then analyzed
the specific functions performed by the investment bankers and classified each task
as either a business defense expense, a "capital facilitative" expense, or alternatively, as part of an "abandoned transaction." 124
1. Business Attack Defense
The court's application of the business attack defense on the facts of Staley was
straightforward. The Staley court determined that most of the investment banking
fees incurred by SCI were related to the defense of its business and corporate
policy;125 therefore, those fees were deductible as "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses. 126

Id. The court also identified a few hours of facilitative work performed by the
investment bankers at the time of the merger. Id. at 492.
11"
Id. at 491. The investment banking fee arrangement provided for $1 million fixed
fee with the remainder of the compensation contingent on an acquisition or recapitalization
of SCI. See supra note 78.
11

120Staley, 119 F.3d at 491.
121

Id.

Id. at 487.
Id. at 488-89.
124 Id. at 489.
125 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
126Staley, 119 F.3d at 491.
122
123
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2. Long-term Benefits

While the INDOPCO Court required fee capitalization because of evidence of
future benefits, 127 the Staley court required fee capitalization because the fees
facilitated a completed capital transaction - in this case, T & L's acquisition of
Staley. 28 The Staley court did not specifically discuss any future benefits the
29
taxpayer might have anticipated in requiring the capitalization of these fees.
Interestingly enough, the Staley court did find long-term benefits analysis
relevant when analyzing costs properly deductible as "abandoned transactions."' 3 °
After reviewing the various alternative transactions contemplated by SCI and the
investment bankers, the court concluded, "These efforts failed; the investment
bankers' services in this regard bore no fruit. As a result, unlike the taxpayer in
INDOPCO, SCI did not obtain a long-term benefit as a result of making these
' 131
expenditures."
B. CriticalAnalysis
1. Overall Approach
The result in Staley is largely a satisfactory one, but the court's approach
evidenced a hesitation to "go all the way." Perhaps that is why the court chose to
employ two tests. The court could have found that all the fees were deductible by
applying either a pure business attack defense test or a pure long-term benefits
test. 32 Even when the court purported to apply INDOPCO,it applied the long-term
benefits test inconsistently. On one hand, the court ignored future benefits when
it determined that "capital facilitative" expenses required capitalization; yet, the

127

INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 88-89 (1992).

'28 Staley, 119 F.3d at 491 (finding that the investment bankers' evaluation of SCI stock
facilitated the merger because it was used to determine that T & L's final offer was fair).
129 The Tax Court found benefits to SCI from changing from a publicly held corporation
to a wholly owned subsidiary in the form of relief from shareholder-related expenses, but
the Court of Appeals did not discuss any benefits. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., v.
Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 197 (1995), rev'd, 119 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1997).
130

Staley, 119 F.3d at 491-92.

131 Id.

at 492 (finding that the costs which could be allocated to efforts to engage in

alternate transactions were deductible as "abandoned transactions").
132 See Staley, 105 T.C. at 218-19 (Laro, J., dissenting). Judge Laro writes: "Having
found facts to conclude that the takeover is hostile, one should strongly suspect that there
are no long-term benefits anticipated by the target in connection with the transaction." Id
at 219.
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court then stressed a lack of future benefits as its rationale for allowing deductibility
' 133
as an "abandoned transaction."
2. "Capital Facilitative" Expenses
The Staley court's reasoning that the investment bankers' evaluation of SCI's
stock facilitated the completed acquisition and therefore required capitalization
because it validated the fairness of T & L's offer is unconvincing.134 Investment
35
bankers routinely perform stock evaluations when they begin an engagement.
Arguably, the major reason SCI' s investment bankers performed a stock evaluation
was to consider alternatives to T & L's hostile takeover attempt. 36 Even when T
& L raised its tender offer price, it was without solicitation from SCI.1 37 If there
were any connection between the evaluation of SCI's stock and the "fairness" of the
ultimate hostile acquisition by T & L, the relationship is too tenuous to require
capitalization.

38

Had the Staley court focused more on the presence of long-term benefits like the
INDOPCO court, this task most likely would have been an "incidental future
benefit" not requiring capitalization. 139 Alternatively, the stock evaluation fee was
just another cost of defending SCI's business or part of the cost of an "abandoned
transaction." In any case, it should have been deductible.

133

Staley, 119 F.3d at 490-92.

134

Id. at 491.

supra note 2, at 2 ("For instance, an investment banker often is retained to
value the corporation's stock and issue a 'fairness' opinion.").
136 Staley, 119 F.3d at 485. Presumably, evaluation of SCI's stock was contained in the
"selling book for prospective buyers that contained information about SCI." Id. In addition,
T & L most likely had its own investment bankers to advise it on tender offer strategy.
Staley, 105 T.C. at 217 (Cohen, J., dissenting) ("Tate & Lyle certainly had its own reasons
for desiring the purchase and was independently evaluating the acquisition in relying on its
own advisers.").
137 Staley, 105 T.C. at 176.
138 Id. at 217 (Cohen, J., dissenting). Judge Cohen makes a similar argument when she
disagrees with the assertion that investment banking fees paid by SCI increased the price of
SCI's stock. Id. She says, "This analysis confuses the simple sequence of events with the
purpose for which the expenditure was incurred, or the cause and effect relationship between
an expenditure and a change in the price of the stock." Id.
139INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992) (stating that "[a]lthough
the mere presence of an incidental future benefit-- 'some future aspect'--may not warrant
capitalization, a taxpayer' s realization of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure
is incurred in undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is
immediate deduction or capitalization").
135 Persellin,
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3. The Investment Banking Fee Arrangement
When the Staley court analyzed the investment banking fee arrangement, it
abandoned its systematic, technical approach and virtually ignored the specifics of
the fee arrangement. 4 ° The court considered the fee arrangement just one relevant
consideration,"' but it never addressed the fact that the majority of the fee was
pegged to a completed transaction. 142 In light of the court's emphasis on capitalization of "capital facilitative" expenses, the court's treatment of the fee arrangement
is surprising; the court might have found that the majority of the fee arrangement
14 3
actually facilitated a completed capital transaction.
C. PracticalConsiderations
The Staley court's use of two different tests to determine tax deductibility of a
target corporation's hostile defense fees is likely to add a new layer of confusion in
the courts.' 44 While the tests themselves are not new, this may be the first time a
court has used two tests simultaneously. In addition, the court's inconsistent
application of the INDOPCOtest makes it uncertain whether the emphasis should
be on "capital facilitative," long-term benefits, or both.' 45
Although the Staley court largely ignored the particulars of the investment
banking fee arrangement, the opinion suggested that "[b]usinesses in the future

140

Staley, 119 F.3d at 491 (recognizing that the fee arrangement was simply a way to be

paid regardless of whether or not the investment bankers were successful in their efforts to
defeat T & L's hostile tender offer).
141 Id.
142 Staley, 105 T.C. at 200 ("Of the approximately $12.5 million in fees paid, [only] $1
million was fixed compensation, payable in any event.").
143 See Lipton, supra note 9, at 26 (stating that "the fundamental flaw
in the taxpayer's
position in Staley is that SCI agreed to pay the investment bankers' fee primarily as a result
of the completion of an acquisition"). For an example of a court that based its decision on
the specifics of a fee arrangement, see Honodel v. Commissioner,76 T.C. 351, 366-67
(1981) (holding that with a two-tier fee schedule consisting of a monthly retainer fee and an
investment fee, the monthly retainer fee was deductible but the investment fees were not
since they were a cost of acquiring an interest in a limited partnership project).
", Confusion for taxpayers is nothing new. See LeBlanc, supra note 8, at 465
("INDOPCOhas certainly created confusion for taxpayers, because now they are unsure as
to the appropriate test to apply in determining the deductibility of expenditures ....
").
145 The uncertainty already existed prior to Staley. See Faber, supra note 22, at 622
(noting that the significance of future benefits after INDOPCOis unclear; the Court did not
attempt to define "future" benefits, nor did it say what other factors could outweigh the
presence of a future benefit).
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would do well to structure their agreements in a fashion more amenable to the
requirements of the Tax Code as we have delineated today." '1 6 At a minimum,
banking fee
some careful attention to tax considerations when drafting investment
1 47
position.
tax
its
defend
corporation
target
a
arrangements may help
Target corporations should also maintain a detailed analysis of takeover-related
identified, it may help a
expenditures. 4 If the costs and their purposes are clearly
49
trial.1
at
proof
of
burden
its
meet
target corporation
D. A Simpler Approach
A simpler approach to the problem of determining tax deductibility for takeover-

related expenses is to use just one test - the long-term benefits test. 5 ° This test has
'46

Staley, 119 F.3d at493.

Lipton, supranote 9, at 26 (suggesting that with a fixed fee arrangement, SCI would
have had a stronger argument that the fees were incurred purely for defensive purposes).
The author suggests a fixed investment bankers' fee in advance, regardless of the outcome
of the takeover. Id. If the investment bankers insist on a contingent fee, then a "failure fee"
147

could be payable if the hostile takeover succeeds, while a larger "success fee" might be
pegged to a friendly acquisition. Id.
14 Coenen, supra note 4, at 614.
4 Id.; see also James David Ruffner, II, Comment, Corporate Reorganization
Expenses: An Overview of the Denial of CurrentFederal Tax Deductibility and Resulting
Capitalization,19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 197, 225 (1993) (stressing proper tax planning by
documenting the nature of expenditures and requesting itemized bills for professional
services). Proper tax planning is particularly important when there are multiple overtures

from potential suitors; proper delineation of expenditures "may present opportunities for
maximizing deductions to the extent that nonrepetitive expenditures, such as those for the

initial valuation of stock, relate to abandoned overtures." Id.
150 But see Lyke, supra note 8, at 1257-58 (stating that a pure long-term benefits test
should not apply to hostile takeover costs because the board's fiduciary duty to incur only

those expenditures which are in the best interests of the corporation would preclude
deductibility). However, Lyke writes that hostile defense costs should be currently
deductible as either business attack defense costs or "abandoned transactions." Id. at 1258;
see also Brett M. Alexander, Comment, An Analysis of INDOPCO,Inc. v. Commissioner,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1505, 1516 (1993) (proposing a distortion of income test instead of a longterm benefits test as the critical factor in determining tax deductibility). Based upon
administrative and practical considerations, this test would permit current deductibility for

some expenditures that provide benefits beyond the tax year. Id. at 1519; cf. Faber, supra
note 22, at 634 ("The issue should be viewed as one of accounting. If a taxpayer's treatment
of an item clearly reflects income, that treatment should be respected without regard to
whether it creates a separate asset or produces a future benefit."); Friedman, supra note 52,
at 1257 (suggesting that Congress should establish a pre-determined amortization period for
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/3
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many advantages.
1. Consistency With Section 263(a)(1)
The current confusion over multiple tests and friendly vs. hostile takeoverrelated expenses overshadows the underlying purposes of the Tax Code. A return
to basics reveals that the ultimate goal of capitalizing expenditures is to match
expenses with the revenues in the taxable periods in which they belong.'
Indeed,
the language of Section 263(a)(1) itself focuses the taxpayer's attention on
"permanent improvement or betterment made to increase the value of
any
property."' 5 2 Therefore, an inquiry into the long-term benefits of an expense is
consistent both with the principle of matching expenses and revenues as well as the
language of the Code itself.'5 3
2. One Test
In many cases, the long-term benefits test will reach the same result as the
application of other tests. 154 The distinctions between hostile and friendly takeoverrelated expenses will be relevant only in the context of determining the presence of

takeover-related expenses). "The courts would be freed from having to determine, on an
individual basis, whether an acquisition is friendly or hostile and whether a long-term benefit
exists." Id.
'' INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). Proper matching results
in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes. Id.
152 Patrick Crawford, Note, INDOPCO v. Commissioner:Form Over Substance
in the
JudicialRegulation ofthe Marketfor CorporateControl, 12 VA. TAx REv. 121, 129 (1992)
("Finally, the Code's language itself focuses the inquiry upon the duration of the benefit.").
The author suggests that the "future benefits" language used by the INDOPCO Court is
broader than the Code's language. Id. at 133. He states that a narrow interpretation should
be given to the Court's language because "[p]reventing harm and maintaining the status quo
are, in one sense, continuing benefits, but they are not necessarily an improvement or
betterment." Id. at 133-34. Thus, a narrow interpretation would allow deductibility of a
target corporation's hostile defense fees. Id. at 134.
113 Ruffner, II, supra note 149, at 201 (concluding that INDOPCO's
long-term benefits
test successfully matches income with expenses but also makes merger and acquisition tax
planning more difficult).
'
For example, hostile takeover-related expenses incurred by a taxpayer in defending
his business and its corporate policies are deductible under the business attack defense as
"ordinary and necessary" expenses. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 119
F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 1997). The expenses would also be deductible under a long-term
benefits analysis. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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long-term benefits.' 55
3. Caveats
The biggest challenge for users of the long-term benefits test will be appropriate
determination of long-term benefits. 156 Because every expense arguably has some
"long-term benefits,"'157 courts will have to adopt a practical approach consistent
with the Tax Code and common sense.' 58 The purpose of expenditures will
undoubtedly continue to play an important role in tax deductibility, particularly in
the assessment of "incidental future benefits" which may not require
159
capitalization.
V. CONCLUSION

While the Staley decision produced a largely satisfactory result, the court's twotest approach for determining the tax deductibility of unsuccessful hostile defense
fees is likely to add even more confusion to an already confused area. A simpler
approach would be to determine tax deductibility of takeover-related expenses
based on a long-term benefits analysis. This test is consistent with the goals of the
applicable Tax Code provisions and entails only a single inquiry. However, until
the courts develop a uniform approach for determining "long-term benefits", tax
deductibility of a target corporation's takeover-related fees will continue to be
decided on a case by case basis, and any "attempt to harmonize them [will] be a
futile task. ' 16°
Corinne E. Anderson

15' A.E.

Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 166, 219 (1995) (Laro, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 119 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1997). This Note essentially adopts the position
of Judge Laro by suggesting that the distinction between a hostile or friendly takeover is
only relevant in determining whether there are any long-term benefits. Id. While hindsight
provides an advantage in determining whether an expenditure provided future benefits, the
focus of the inquiry should be on the taxpayer's expectations at the time the expense was
incurred.
156 For some of the difficulties in applying the long-term benefits test (future benefits),
see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
117 Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971).
151 Staley, 119 F.3d at 487 (commenting on the difficulty of determining tax deductibility
that "[b]ecause of this difficulty, distinguishing between ordinary and capital costs often
requires a rather pragmatic approach").
159 INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 87 (1992).
160 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 116 (1933).
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